Swine Flu Deja Vu

Margie Bernard

“There is no evidence that any influenza vaccine thus far developed is effective in preventing or mitigating any attack of influenza. The producers of these vaccines know that they are worthless, but they go on selling them anyway.” Dr. J. Anthony Morris (formerly Chief Vaccine Control Officer at the Federal Drug Agency at the Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, DC, 1976)

I met Dr. Anthony (Tony) Morris during the autumn of 1977, when he made an appointment for a consult at the Government Accountability Project (GAP), Washington, DC. GAP was a project initiated by Ralph Stavins, a Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS). Stavins had hired me as GAP’s first Director in October 1977, and I was charged with setting up the first conference on Whistleblowing in National Security Agencies to be held May 19-20, 1978.

Morris had come to GAP seeking assurance of our continued support in his attempt to overturn his dismissal as Chief Vaccine Control Officer at the United States Food and Drug Administration of the then Department of Health, Education and Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human Services). GAP agreed to champion his legal battle against FDA by publicizing his case and making available the film made about this matter, The Swine Flu Caper, directed by Saul Landau, another IPS Fellow.

Nearly two-years before, the US public had been warned that a likely Swine Flu (New Jersey H1N1), pandemic was on the 1976-77 horizons. At that time, the major pharmaceutical companies raced to develop a vaccine to counter its presumed devastation. Once a vaccine was approved for use by the FDA, President Gerald Ford had his inoculation witnessed via major-time television news as encouragement for others to do the same. Based on his research Morris disagreed with the rush to vaccinate the masses.

Dr. Morris had long been a critic of all flu vaccine. Based on test results obtained in his laboratory research, he had cautioned his colleagues at the Agency that in his expert opinion these inoculations were a major factor in triggering various neurologic illnesses ranging from GBS (Guillain-Barre Syndrome) (1) to encephalitis to paralysis and in some instances death. In the case of the new Swine Flu serum, Morris felt that aside from his usual misgivings about flu vaccines in general, he felt there had not been adequate testing undertaken to justify its use in this instance. Interestingly Morris had one unlikely ally—the Federal Insurance Company. This principal underwriter for pharmaceutical companies refused coverage to the four manufacturers of the swine flu serum stating: ‘it was not convinced that there has been time enough to test the vaccine for side effects’. (2)

Furthermore, there was general speculation as to whether there was such a disease as Swine Flu. And, if there were, did the proposed deterrent present a greater danger to the public than the illness itself? When Dr. Morris reported his professional concerns about this particular serum to FDA hierarchy they were ignored. Then in the interest of public safety he went public with the information in a July 1976 article in the Washington Post. He was then summarily fired for ‘insubordination and inefficiency’ by FDA Commissioner Alexander Schmidt and government agents entered his lab, killed all the animals used in his vaccine research and confiscated all his and his lab assistants’ research papers.

At the end of the day there was no Swine Flu epidemic in 1976 and the vaccination program was ended ten-weeks after it was initiated due to increased concern as to its safety.

The current observation is that we face another potential Swine Flu (2009 H1N1 virus), pandemic and although such observation may be political/social fact, ‘whether it becomes a scientific fact and a policy fact is yet to be seen’. (3) As to the speculation of a new pandemic, MSNBC has reported:

The Center for Disease Control has found that rapid tests to diagnose the “swine flu” can be wrong as much as nine times out of ten. The “best” test was wrong half the time, the CDC found. The government study indicating that rapid tests to diagnose the “swine flu” could hardly distinguish between the “swine flu” and normal seasonal flu gives support to those medical experts who say the “swine flu” is a harmless, ordinary flu that is being hyped by the WHO and the vaccine companies to justify a pandemic level 6 declaration and mass forced vaccinations. (4)

In the past, health care workers had a choice whether or not to get inoculated against flu—whether the annual seasonal virus or a unique variation. This year, however, many medical centers, hospitals and clinics are mandating their personnel to be inoculated or face disciplinary action. This has raised concerns among health care professionals themselves as well as their unions and professional associations. During the annual flu season, only about one-half of health-care workers get the shot. As one clerical worker in Washington Hospital Center stated, “I don’t think I should be forced to take something I don’t want to take”. And, in Great Britain, a survey of 1,500 nurses disclosed that one-third would not get the vaccine due to safety concerns. (5)

During the 1976 Swine Flu scare, numerous law suits were filed by people alleging they had suffered various side effects as a direct result of being inoculated. Several of these litigations were successful and large payouts were made by the pharmaceutical companies and the US government as settlement. This month, September 2009, Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius signed a document that grants legal immunity to federal officials and the vaccine producers from similar claims.

As for myself, I plan to follow Tony’s 1976 advice and forgo the Swine Flu shot this year but will get the seasonal flu jab just as I have in years past as this serum has been through more rigorous testing prior to its release.

And what happened to Morris’s efforts to overturn his 1976 FDA dismissal? After a seven-year legal battle, James S. Turner’s tireless defense of Morris successfully proved that all FDA charges against Morris were false.

NOTE: These are my citations, however, the referant numbers have been somehow eliminated in this cut-n-paste version so I've added them thus (n).

(1) There were reports of GBS affecting some people who had received swine flu immunizations in the 1976 U.S. outbreak of swine flu. Overall, there were about 500 cases of GBS—25 of which resulted in death from severe pulmonary complications— which, according to Dr. P. Haber, were probably caused by an immunopathological reaction to the 1976 swine flu vaccine. Haber P, Sejvar J, Mikaeloff Y, Destefano F (2009). Vaccines and Guillain-Barre Syndrome.
(2) Business Insurance, May 1976
(3) Spencer, D., Millar J.D., Reflections on the 1976 Swine Flu Vaccination Program. Emerging Infectious Diseases, Center for Disease Control, Vol. 12, No. 1, January 2006
(4) An Interesting Article on the Swine Flu. The Flu Review, http://theflureview.com/an-interesting-article-on-the-swine-flu/ January 29, 2009.
(5) Mandatory Flu Shots Hit Resistance, Rob Stein, The Washington Post, September 25, 2009

Whistleblower Tried to Prevent Iraq War

The Whistleblowers of the world need our support. And, for any of you contemplating blowing the whistle on government or corporate fraud, malfeasance and illegal activities, before doing so please contact Government Accountability Project: http://www.whistleblower.org/. The following article was originally posted on http://www.truthout.org/

Story of the Whistleblower Who Tried to Prevent the Iraq War
Thursday 25 September 2008

by: Norman Solomon, t r u t h o u t Perspective


Katharine Gun worked at the British intelligence agency when she discovered an NSA memo that she used in an attempt to stop the invasion of Iraq.

Of course, Katharine Gun was free to have a conscience, as long as it didn't interfere with her work at a British intelligence agency. To the authorities, practically speaking, a conscience was apt to be less tangible than a pixel on a computer screen. But suddenly - one routine morning, while she was scrolling through email at her desk - conscience struck. It changed Katharine Gun's life, and it changed history.

Despite the nationality of this young Englishwoman, her story is profoundly American - all the more so because it has remained largely hidden from the public in the United States. When Katharine Gun chose, at great personal risk, to reveal an illicit spying operation at the United Nations in which the US government was the senior partner, she brought out of the transatlantic shadows a special relationship that could not stand the light of day.

By then, in early 2003, the president of the United States - with dogged assists from the British prime minister following close behind - had long since become transparently determined to launch an invasion of Iraq. Gun's moral concerns were not unusual; she shared, with countless other Brits and Americans, strong opposition to the impending launch of war. Yet, thanks to a simple and intricate twist of fate, she abruptly found herself in a rare position to throw a roadblock in the way of the political march to war from Washington and London. Far more extraordinary, though, was her decision to put herself in serious jeopardy on behalf of revealing salient truths to the world.

We might envy such an opportunity, and admire such courage on behalf of principle. But there are good, or at least understandable, reasons so few whistleblowers emerge from institutions that need conformity and silence to lay flagstones on the path to war. Those reasons have to do with matters of personal safety, financial security, legal jeopardy, social cohesion and default positions of obedience. They help to explain why and how people go along to get along with the warfare state even when it flagrantly rests on foundations of falsehoods.

The emailed memorandum from the US National Security Agency (NSA) that jarred Katharine Gun that fateful morning was dated less than two months before the invasion of Iraq that was to result in thousands of deaths among the occupying troops and hundreds of thousands more among Iraqi people. We're told that this is a cynical era, but there was nothing cynical about Katharine Gun's response to the memo that appeared without warning on her desktop. Reasons to shrug it off were plentiful, in keeping with bottomless rationales for prudent inaction. The basis for moral engagement and commensurate action was singular.

The import of the NSA memo was such that it shook the government of Tony Blair and caused uproars on several continents. But for the media in the United States, it was a minor story. For The New York Times, it was no story at all.

At last, a new book tells this story. "The Spy Who Tried to Stop a War" packs a powerful wallop. To understand in personal, political and historic terms - what Katharine Gun did, how the British and American governments responded, and what the US news media did and did not report - is to gain a clear-eyed picture of a military-industrial-media complex that plunged ahead with the invasion of Iraq shortly after her brave action of conscience. That complex continues to promote what Martin Luther King Jr. called "the madness of militarism."

In a time when political players and widely esteemed journalists are pleased to posture with affects of great sophistication, Katharine Gun's response was disarmingly simple. She activated her conscience when clear evidence came into her hands that war - not diplomacy seeking to prevent it - headed the priorities list of top leaders at both 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue and 10 Downing Street. "At the time," she recalled, "all I could think about was that I knew they were trying really hard to legitimize an invasion, and they were willing to use this new intelligence to twist arms, perhaps blackmail delegates, so they could tell the world they had achieved a consensus for war."

She and her colleagues at the Government Communications Headquarters were, as she later put it, "being asked to participate in an illegal process with the ultimate aim of achieving an invasion in violation of international law."

The authors of "The Spy Who Tried to Stop a War," Marcia and Thomas Mitchell, describe the scenario this way: "Twisting the arms of the recalcitrant [UN Security Council] representatives in order to win approval for a new resolution could supply the universally acceptable rationale." After Katharine Gun discovered what was afoot, "she attempted to stop a war by destroying its potential trigger mechanism, the required second resolution that would make war legal."

Instead of mere accusation, the NSA memo provided substantiation. That fact explains why US intelligence agencies firmly stonewalled in response to media inquiries - and it may also help to explain why the US news media gave the story notably short shrift. To a significant degree, the scoop did not reverberate inside the American media echo chamber because it was too sharply telling to blend into the dominant orchestrated themes.

While supplying the ostensible first draft of history, US media filtered out vital information that could refute the claims of Washington's exalted war planners. "Journalists, too many of them - some quite explicitly - have said that they see their mission as helping the war effort," an American media critic warned during the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq. "And if you define your mission that way, you'll end up suppressing news that might be important, accurate, but maybe isn't helpful to the war effort."

Jeff Cohen (a friend and colleague of mine) spoke those words before the story uncorked by Katharine Gun's leak splashed across British front pages and then scarcely dribbled into American media. He uttered them on the MSNBC television program hosted by Phil Donahue, where he worked as a producer and occasional on-air analyst. Donahue's prime time show was canceled by NBC management three weeks before the invasion - as it happened, on almost the same day that the revelation of the NSA memo became such a big media story in the United Kingdom and such a carefully bypassed one in the United States.

Soon, a leaked NBC memo confirmed suspicions that the network had pulled the plug on Donahue's show in order to obstruct views and information that would go against the rush to war. The network memo said that the Donahue program would present a "difficult public face for NBC in a time of war." And: "He seems to delight in presenting guests who are antiwar, anti-Bush and skeptical of the administration's motives." Cancellation of the show averted the danger that it could become "a home for the liberal antiwar agenda at the same time that our competitors are waving the flag at every opportunity."

Overall, to the editors of American mass media, the actions and revelations of Katharine Gun merited little or no reporting - especially when they mattered most. My search of the comprehensive LexisNexis database found that for nearly three months after her name was first reported in the British media, US news stories mentioning her scarcely existed.

When the prosecution of Katharine Gun finally concluded its journey through the British court system, the authors note, a surge of American news reports on the closing case "had people wondering why they hadn't heard about the NSA spy operation at the beginning." This book includes an account of journalistic evasion that is a grim counterpoint to the story of conscience and courage that just might inspire us to activate more of our own.

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This article was adapted from Norman Solomon's foreword to the new book by Marcia and Thomas Mitchell, "The Spy Who Tried to Stop a War: Katharine Gun and the Secret Plot to Sanction the Iraq Invasion